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Abstract
We study the monotonicity properties of solutions in the classic
problem of fair cake-cutting - dividing a single heterogeneous resource
among agents with subjective utilities. Resource- and population-
monotonicity relate to scenarios where the cake, or the number of
participants who divide the cake, changes. It is required that the
utility of all participants change in the same direction: either all of
them are better-off (if there is more to share) or all are worse-off (if
there is less to share). We formally introduce these concepts to the
cake-cutting setting and present a meticulous axiomatic analysis. We
show that classical cake-cutting protocols, like the Cut and Choose,
Banach-Knaster, Dubins-Spanier and many other fail to be monotonic.
We also show that, when the allotted pieces must be contiguous, pro-
portionality and Pareto-optimality are incompatible with each of the
monotonicity axioms. We provide a resource-monotonic protocol for
two players and show the existence of rules that satisfy various combi-
nations of contiguousness, proportionality, Pareto-optimality and the
two monotonicity axioms.
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1 Introduction
Two siblings Ann and Miriam inherit a piece of land from their father. Just
as soon as they agree on how to share the land, they learn that their father
recently bought another strip of land. They re-divide the whole estate. How-
ever Miriam ends up with a more valuable piece of land while Ann is worse
off. Ann feels that they should try another division protocol.
After a little reasoning Ann and Miriam manage to divide the estate.
Just as soon as they settle the issue, they discover that they have a little
step-brother. They decide to divide the land threeways by using the same
division rule as before. However Ann ends up with a more valuable piece of
land while Miriam is worse off. Miriam feels that they should try another
division protocol.
These two examples motivate the so called resource-monotonicity (RM)
and population-monotonicity (PM) axioms. Resource-monotonicity, some-
times known as aggregate monotonicity, requires that when new resources
are added, and the same division rule is used consistently, the welfare of the
participants should weakly increase. Population-monotonicity is concerned
with changes in the number of participants. No one should profit from the ar-
rival of a new agent, when more people share the same resource, and everyone
should be weakly better off if someone leaves.
In both cases fairness stems from solidarity. If there is less to share some
agents will necessarily lose. Hence it is only fair to require that the loss is
(weakly) shared by all agents. On the other hand economic growth might be
objected if the benefits are not shared by everyone1.
We study the two monotonicity requirements in the framework of the
classic fair cake-cutting problem (Steinhaus, 1948), where a single heteroge-
neous resource - such as land or time - has to be divided fairly. Cake-cutting
protocols can be applied in inheritance cases and divorce settlements. They
can be also used to divide broadcast time of advertisements and priority ac-
cess time for customers of an Internet service provider (Caragiannis et al.,
2011; Procaccia, 2015).
Experimental studies show that people value certain fairness criteria more
than others. Herreiner and Puppe (2009) demonstrated that people are will-
ing to sacrifice Pareto-efficiency in order to reach an envy free allocation. To
our knowledge no study was ever conducted to unfold the relationship be-
tween monotonicity and efficiency or proportionality. However some indirect
evidence points toward that monotonicity of the solution is in some cases as
1A recurring theme in recent social movements like the "99%" and "Occupy Wall
Street" is that although the current economic system indeed brings economic growth, it
does only to a small fraction of the population, while the other 99% becomes poorer.
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important as proportionality.
In the apportionment problem there is a parliament with a fixed num-
ber of seats and administrative regions with different number of voters. The
question is  assuming that electoral districts are of equal size within each of
the administrative regions  how to distribute the seats among the admin-
istrative regions to minimize the differences between the voters influences.
The problem is analogous to cake-cutting where the cake corresponds to the
parliamentary seats which have to be distributed. During the 1880 US census
C.W. Seaton, a Chief Clerk of the Census Office, noted that an enlargement
of the House of Representatives from 299 to 300 would result in a loss of seat
for State Alabama. This anomaly together with the later discovered popu-
lation and new state paradoxes pressed the legislators to adopt newer and
newer apportionment rules. The currently used seat distribution method is
free from such anomalies, however it does not satisfy the so called Hare-quota,
a basic guarantee of proportionality (Balinski and Young, 1975).
Here we present a systematic analysis of the relationship of resource and
population-monotonicity and classical axioms such as Pareto-efficiency and
proportionality. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that
studies these questions in a cake-cutting setting2.
We survey many traditional cake-cutting protocols and show that they
do not satisfy either of the monotonicity axioms. In particular, all methods
based on the Cut and Choose scheme violate resource-monotonicity. More-
over, we show that, if each agent must receive a contiguous piece, then each
of the monotonicity properties is incompatible with Pareto-optimality.
On the other hand, we present several division rules that satisfy some -
but not all - of the properties desired from a cake division:
• The rightmost-mark protocol for two agents, which is resource-monotonic
with contiguous pieces;
• The max-equitable-connected rule for n agents, which is population-
monotonic with contiguous pieces;
• Two variants of the leximin rule with disconnected pieces, which are
Pareto-optimal and population-monotonic, in addition one of them sat-
isfies proportionality while the other is resource-monotonic.
2Although the idea itself is not new. Berliant et al. (1992) already mentioned in the
conclusion that "...there are a number of important issues that should be tackled next
pertaining, in particular, to the existence of selections from the no-envy solution satisfying
additional properties, Examples are monotonicity with respect to the amount to be divided
(all agents should benefit from such an increase), and with respect to changes in the number
of claimants (all agents initially present should lose in such circumstances)."
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The equitable and leximin rules belong to the cardinal welfarism frame-
work (cf. chapter 3 of Moulin (2004)). They rely on inter-agent utility
comparison, and make sense if and when such a comparison is feasible. For
example, suppose the agents are firms, each of which wants to use the land
to a pre-specified purpose (e.g. one firm plans to dig for oil, another firm
wants to build housing complexes, etc.). Then, economic models can be used
to estimate the monetary utility of each firm for each piece of land and the
estimates can be used to calculate leximin/equitable divisions.
Although these two rules have several drawbacks, such as high computa-
tional complexity and strategic issues that make them hard to implement in
real life, their mere existence shows that it is possible to combine monotonic-
ity with certain fairness axioms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 formally presents the cake-cutting problem and the monotonicity
axioms. Section 4 examines classical cake-cutting protocols and shows that
they are not monotonic. Section 5 generalizes these examples and proves
that monotonicity is impossible to attain in combination with contiguousness,
Pareto-optimality and proportionality. Section 6 shows that, if one of these
requirements is relaxed, monotonic division rules exist. The rules are formally
defined and their properties are proved. Section 7 concludes and presents a
table summarizing the various rules' properties.
2 Related Work
The cake-cutting problem originates from the work of the polish mathemati-
cian Hugo Steinhaus and his students Banach and Knaster (Steinhaus, 1948).
Their primary concern was how to divide the cake in a fair way. Since then,
game theorists analyzed the strategic issues related to cake-cutting, while
computer scientists were focusing mainly on how to implement solutions, i.e.
the computational complexity of cake-cutting protocols.
Monotonicity issues have been extensively studied with respect to cooper-
ative game theory (Calleja et al., 2012), political representation (Balinski and
Young, 1982) and other fair division problems: Chapter 6 of (Moulin, 2004)
and Chapter 7 of Thomson (2011) provide extensive reviews of monotonicity
axioms.
Thomson (1997) defines the replacement principle, which requires that,
whenever any change happens in the environment, the welfare of all agents
not responsible for the change should be affected in the same direction - they
should all be made at least as well off as they were initially or they should all
be made at most as well off. This is the most general way of expressing the
4
idea of solidarity among agents. The PM and RM axioms are special cases
of this principle.
The consistency axiom (cf. Young (1987) or Thomson (2012)) is related
to population-monotonicity, but it is fundamentally different as in that case
the leaving agents take their fair shares with them.
Arzi et al. (2011) study the "dumping paradox" in cake-cutting. They
show that, in some cakes, discarding a part of the cake improves the to-
tal social welfare of any envy-free division. This implies that enlarging the
cake might decrease the total social welfare. This is related to resource-
monotonicity; the difference is that in our case we are interested in the welfare
of the individual agents and not in the total social welfare.
Chambers (2005) studies a related cake-cutting axiom called "division in-
dependence": if the cake is divided into sub-plots and each sub-plot is divided
according to a rule, then the outcome should be identical to dividing the orig-
inal land using the same rule. He proves that the only rule which satisfies
Pareto-optimality and division independence is the utilitarian-optimal rule
- the rule which maximizes the sum of the agents' utilities. Unfortunately,
this rule does not satisfy fairness axioms such as proportionality.
Walsh (2011) studies the problem of "online cake-cutting", in which
agents arrive and depart during the process of dividing the cake. He shows
how to adapt classic procedures like cut-and-choose and the Dubins-Spanier
in order to satisfy online variants of the fairness axioms. Monotonicity prop-
erties are not studied, although the problem is similar in spirit to the concept
of population-monotonicity.
3 Model
3.1 Cake-cutting
A cake-cutting problem is a triple (N,C, (vˆCi )i∈N) where:
• N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denotes the set of agents who participate in the cake-
cutting process. In examples with a small number of agents, we often
refer to them by names (Alice, Bob, Carl...).
• C is the cake, which is assumed to be an interval in R. By convention
the left endpoint of this interval is the origin, that is C = [0, c] for some
real number c. We call a Lebesgue-measureable subset of C a slice. A
slice that is allotted to an agent is called a piece.
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• vˆCi is the value measure of agent i, which is a real-valued function on
the slices of C. When it does not cause confusion we will omit C from
the upper index, and simply write vˆi.
As the term "measure" implies, the value measures of all agents are
countably additive. Moreover, we assume that the value measures are non-
negative, monotonic, bounded and non-atomic. That is, vˆi assigns a non-
negative, but finite number to each slice of C. The value measures of a union
of disjoint slices is just the sum of the values of the slices. Note that non-
negativity and additivity already imply monotonicity, i.e. if S, T are two slices
and S ⊆ T then vˆi(S) ≤ vˆi(T ), for all i ∈ N . Finally, non-atomicity means
that any slice with a Lebesgue-measure of zero has value zero. In particular
any point on the interval is worthless for the agents. These assumptions are
standard in the cake-cutting literature.
Our model diverges from the standard cake-cutting setup is that we do not
require the value measures to be normalized. That is the value of the entire
cake is not necessarily the same for all agents. This is important because we
examine scenarios where the cake changes, so the cake value might become
higher or lower. Hence, we differentiate between absolute and relative value
measures:
• The absolute value measure of the entire cake, vˆi(C), can be any posi-
tive value and it can be different for different agents.
• The relative value of the entire cake is 1 for all agents. Relative value
measures are denoted by vCi and defined by: v
C
i (S) = vˆ
C
i (S)/vˆ
C
i (C).
Again, for convenience's sake we will write simply vi(S) when there is
only one cake.
It is also common to assume that value measures are private information
of the agents. This question leads us to whether agents are honest about their
preferences. As we noted before cake-cutting problems can be studied from
a strategic angle. Here, however, we will not analyze the strategic behaviour
of the agents.
The aim is to divide the cake into n pairwise-disjoint slices. A division
rule is a function that takes a cake-cutting problem as input and returns a
division X = (X1, . . . , Xn), or a set of divisions. Note that a division does
not necessarily compose a partition of C (i.e. free disposal is assumed). A
division rule R is called essentially single-valued if X, Y ∈ R(Γ) implies that
vˆi(Xi) = vˆi(Yi) for all i ∈ N. That is, even if R returns a set of divisions, all
agents are indifferent between these divisions because they have exactly the
same value-vector.
The classical requirements of fair cake-cutting are the following.
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• A division X is called proportional (PROP) if each agent gets at least
1/n fraction of the cake according to his own evaluation, i.e. vi(Xi) ≥
1/n for all i ∈ N . Note that the definition uses relative values.
• A division is called Pareto-optimal (PO) if there is no other division
which is weakly better for all agents and strictly better for at least one
agent.
• A division X is called contiguous (CON) if each agent receives a con-
nected piece (i.e. each Xi is an interval).
• A divisionX is called whole (WH) if the entire cake is divided, ∪ni=1Xi =
C.
Often, we are interested only in contiguous divisions. In these cases,
Pareto-optimality might not make sense as the augmenting division might
not consist of contiguous pieces.
• We call a division Pareto-optimal for Contiguous Allocations (POCA)
if there is no division made up of contiguous pieces which is weakly
better for all agents and strictly better for at least one agent.
A division rule is called proportional it returns only proportional divisions.
The same applies to Pareto-optimality, contiguousness and wholeness.
3.2 Monotonicity
We now define the two monotonicity properties. In the introduction we
defined them informally for the special case in which the division rule returns
a single division. Our formal definition is more general and applicable to rules
that may return a set of divisions.
Definition 3.1. Let N be a fixed set of agents, C = [0, c], C ′ = [0, c′] two
cakes where c < c′, and let (vˆCi )i∈N , (vˆ
C′
i )i∈N be two value measures such that
(vˆC
′
i )i∈N coincides with (vˆ
C
i )i∈N on the Lebesgue-measurable subsets of C.
The cake-cutting problem Γ′ = (N,C ′, (vˆC
′
i )i∈N) is called a cake-enlargement
of the problem Γ = (N,C, (vˆCi )i∈N).
By definition the cake is always enlarged on the right hand side. This
might be critical for some protocols. For instance in the Dubins-Spanier
moving knife protocol the cake is processed from left to right (Dubins and
Spanier, 1961). However, most of our results (except that of Subsection 6.3)
are valid whether the cake is enlarged from the left, right or middle.
7
Definition 3.2. (a) A division rule R is called upwards resource-monotonic,
if for all pairs (Γ,Γ′), where Γ′ is a cake-enlargement of Γ, for every division
X ∈ R(Γ) there exists a division Y ∈ R(Γ′) such that vˆi(Yi) ≥ vˆi(Xi) for all
i ∈ N (i.e all agents are weakly better-off in the new division).
(b) A division rule R is called downwards resource-monotonic, if for all
pairs (Γ′,Γ), where Γ′ is a cake-enlargement of Γ, for every division Y ∈ R(Γ′)
there exists a division X ∈ R(Γ) such that vˆi(Xi) ≤ vˆi(Yi) for all i ∈ N (i.e
all agents are weakly worse-off in the new division).
(c) A division rule is resource-monotonic (RM), if it is both upwards- and
downwards resource-monotonic.
The definition of resource-monotonicity in Thomson (2011) requires all
divisions in R(Γ) to be weakly better/worse than all divisions in R(Γ′). In
contrast, our definition only requires that there exists such a division. This
is closer to the definition of aggregate monotonicity, which originates from
cooperative game theory Peleg and Sudhölter (2007). The idea is that even
if a set-valued solution is used, only a single allocation will be implemented.
Hence the divider can be faithful to the monotonicity principle even if the
rule suggests many non-monotonic allocations as well. This distinction will
be important later on in case of set valued solutions. For essentially single-
valued solutions, however, the two approaches are equivalent. Note that the
definition of RM cares only about absolute values. The relative value of an
agent, vi(Xi), is allowed to decrease.
Definition 3.3. Let C be a fixed cake, N and N ′ two sets of agents such
that N ⊃ N ′ and (vˆi)i∈N their value measures. The cake-cutting problem
Γ′ = (N ′, C, (vˆi)i∈N ′) is called a population-reduction of the problem Γ =
(N,C, (vˆi)i∈N).
Definition 3.4. (a) A division ruleR is called upwards population-monotonic,
if for all pairs (Γ′,Γ) such that Γ′ is a population-reduction of Γ, for every
division Y ∈ R(Γ′) there exists a division X ∈ R(Γ) such that vˆi(Xi) ≤ vˆi(Yi)
for all i ∈ N ′ (all the original agents are weakly worse-off in the new division).
(b) A division rule R is called downwards population-monotonic, if for all
pairs (Γ,Γ′) such that Γ′ is a population-reduction of Γ, for every division
X ∈ R(Γ) there exists a division Y ∈ R(Γ′) such that vˆi(Yi) ≥ vˆi(Xi) for all
i ∈ N ′ (all remaining agents are weakly better-off in the new division).
(c) A division rule is population-monotonic (PM), if it is both upwards
and downwards population-monotonic.
For essentially-single-valued solutions, downwards resource (or popula-
tion) monotonicity implies upwards resource (or population) monotonicity
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x︸ ︷︷ ︸
cake
vˆ′([0, x])
x︸ ︷︷ ︸
cake
vˆ([0, x])
vˆ2([0, x])
vˆ1([0, x])
Figure 1: Piecewise homogeneous cake with two players. The derivative of
vˆ([0, x]) indicates the density of the utility. Note that the value measures are
not normalized, hence vˆ1([0, c]) 6= vˆ2([0, c]).
and vice versa. Set valued solutions, however, may satisfy only one direction
of these axioms.
4 Monotonicity and classical protocols
Although resource and population-monotonicity are well established axioms
in various fields of fair division, the cake-cutting literature has not adopted
these ideas so far. Moreover, classical division methods like the Banach-
Knaster (Steinhaus, 1948), Cut and Choose, Dubins-Spanier (Dubins and
Spanier, 1961), Even-Paz (Even and Paz, 1984), Fink (Fink, 1964) or the
Selfridge-Conway protocol all do not satisfy these axioms. A detailed expla-
nation for most of these can be found in (Brams and Taylor, 1996). Admit-
tedly this list is incomplete, still it illustrates our point well.
All the counterexamples below feature piecewise homogeneous cakes. Such
cakes are finite unions of disjoint intervals, such that on each interval the
value densities of all agents are constant (although different agents may
evaluate the same piece differently). In such cases, the function vˆi([0, x])
 which displays the value (for Agent i) of the piece which lies left to the
point x ∈ R  is piecewise linear (see Figure 1). We stress that our divi-
sion rules, presented in the next section, hold for arbitrary cakes - not only
piecewise-homogeneous. The use of piecewise-homogeneous cakes is only for
counter-examples.
Piecewise homogeneous cakes can be represented by a simple table con-
taining the value densities of the agents on the different slices. For example
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the cake in Figure 1 has the following representation.
vˆA 2.5 0 2 2 0 0
vˆB 1 1 0 0 1 1
First let us examine why Cut and Choose is not resource-monotonic. In
the next couple of examples the H sign over a column indicates the enlarge-
ment.
vˆA 1 1 1 1
vˆB 0 0 2 3
H
vˆA 1 1 1 1 2
vˆB 0 0 2 3 0
Table 1: Colored cells indicate the pieces of the agents.
Consider the cake described in Table 1. While the extra piece is not
present, Agent A (Alice) cuts the cake after the second slice, allowing Agent
B (Bob) to choose the piece worth 5 for him. However if we enlarge the cake,
Alice cuts after the third slice and no matter which piece Bob chooses, he
loses utility. This simple counterexample implies that the Banach-Knaster,
Dubins-Spanier, Even-Paz and the Fink methods are not resource-monotonic
either, as they all produce the same division on the above cake as the Cut
and Choose.3
Note that the fact that we enlarge the cake on the right-hand side is
not an issue here. As the next example shows the Dubins-Spanier method
violates resource-monotonicity even if we reverse its order, i.e. we move the
knives and execute the cuts from right to left.
vˆA 4 0 0
vˆB 1 1 1
vˆC 1 1 1
H
vˆA 4 0 0 2
vˆB 1 1 1 0
vˆC 1 1 1 0
Before the enlargement, Bob got the rightmost slice and Carl got the
middle slice, leaving Alice with a piece worth 4 for her. With the extra piece
present, Alice picks the rightmost slice4. Similar reasoning shows that the
reverse Even-Paz is not resource-monotonic either.
3A more recent protocol, the Recursive Cut and Choose, proposed by Tasnádi (2003),
violates resource-monotonicity for the same reason.
4Here we rely on the assumption that the value measures are private information,
otherwise Alice would be prompted to act strategically.
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Finally, the Selfridge-Conway protocol - the only envy-free method we
survey here - is not resource-monotonic either. Consider the following cake.
vˆA 4 2 2 4 6
vˆB 4 2 2 4 0
vˆC 0 0 2 4 0
H H
vˆA 4 2 2 4 6 6 12
vˆB 4 2 2 4 0 0 0
vˆC 0 0 2 4 0 0 0
Alice divides the cake into three equal parts: the two leftmost slices, the
third and fourth slices, and the rightmost slice. The two most valuable parts
for Bob are worth the same so he passes. Then the agents choose in the order
Carl, Bob, Alice and each obtain 6 units of utility. However if the cake is
enlarged, Bob finds only one part of the cake valuable, so he puts that aside.
Carl takes the uncut part (which is worthless for him). Then Bob cuts the
remaining part into three equal parts. The agents take one slice each in the
order Carl, Alice, Bob. This way, Carl ends up with a piece worth only 4 for
him.
Population-monotonicity is not applicable to protocols with fixed number
of agents, such as Cut and Choose and Selfridge-Conway. For symmetry
reasons, reversing the direction of how a protocol processes the cake has
no consequence on whether the protocol violates population-monotonicity or
not. In the next couple of examples the cells of the leaving player are colored
gray.
First we show that the Banach-Knaster method is not population-monotonic.
In the following table ε is a very small positive real number.
vˆA 2 2 2 1 1
vˆB 0 2 + ε 2 1 1
vˆC 0 0 0 6 6
vˆD 1 + ε 0 1 1 1
vˆA 2 2 2 1 1
vˆB 0 2 + ε 2 1 1
vˆC 0 0 0 6 6
vˆD 1 + ε 0 1 1 1
Suppose the order of the agents is: Alice, Bob, Carl, David. While Alice
is present, she starts the process and she cuts after the first slice. Since David
believes that this slice is slightly larger than 1/4 fraction of the cake, he will
take it. Next, Alice cuts after the second slice. Bob thinks it is slightly bigger
than his proportional share, so he diminishes ε part of it. No one else after
him trims the slice, hence he takes it. Only Alice and Carl remain. They
apply Cut and Choose. Since Alice cuts, Carl can take the piece worth 12
for him.
If Alice leaves the scene, Bob starts the process. He cuts after the second
slice and he takes it too. The rest is divided with Cut and Choose and Carl
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loses utility. Note that Carl would lose utility even if David were to cut.
For the Dubins-Spanier moving-knife method, consider the following cake.
vˆA 2 2 1 1 2
vˆB 0 0 3 1 8
vˆC 0 0 1 1 2
vˆD 2 2 0 0 8
vˆA 2 2 1 1 2
vˆB 0 0 3 1 8
vˆC 0 0 1 1 2
vˆD 2 2 0 0 8
If we apply the Dubins-Spanier moving knife methods, then Alice is the
first to stop the algorithm and takes the first slice. Since the next section of
the cake is not that valuable for David, Bob and Carl will be the next two
cutters. Thus David receives a piece worth 8 for him. However if Alice leaves
the process, then David will be the first to stop the knife, taking a piece of
value 4.
Consider now the Fink procedure. This procedure was specifically de-
signed with upwards-population-monotonicity in mind: when a new agent
joins an existing division, he takes a proportional share from each of the ex-
isting agents, so all existing agents are weakly worse off (they all participate
in supporting the new agent, which is what PM is all about). However, the
Fink procedure is not downwards-PM, as the following example shows:
vˆA 2 2 2 2 1 1 2
vˆB 0 0 0 4 2 2 4
vˆC 0 0 0 2 1 1 2
vˆA 2 2 2 2 1 1 2
vˆB 0 0 0 4 2 2 4
vˆC 0 0 0 2 1 1 2
Suppose that initially Alice and Bob use Cut and Choose and Bob is the
chooser. He is able to salvage the whole cake according to his own evaluation.
Now they divide their pieces into three equal parts, and Carl gets to choose
one slice from each of them. Hence, Bob ends up with a piece worth at least
8 for him. But if Alice leaves, then Bob and Carl have to redivide the cake
using Cut and Choose. Then, no matter who cuts, Bob ends up with only 6.
The above example seemingly contradicts our claim that upwards-PM
implies downwards-PM and vice versa for single valued solutions. However
there is a subtle difference here. The Fink procedure is based on a predefined
order of the agents, and it is only upwards monotonic if the new agent is the
last in the order. An alternative explanation is to treat the Fink rule as
a set-valued rule, which returns n! possible allocations, for all n! possible
orderings of the agents. Under this definition, the Fink rule is upwards-PM,
but not downwards-PM as shown in the example.
Finally we show that the Even-Paz method is not population-monotonic.
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vˆA 2 0 0 0 1 3
vˆB 0 2 1 3 0 0
vˆC 0 0 2 1 3 0
vˆA 2 0 0 0 1 3
vˆB 0 2 1 3 0 0
vˆC 0 0 2 1 3 0
Since there are three of them, the agents divide the above cake into left
and right part with ratio 1 : 2. Since the leftmost mark belongs to Alice, she
gets the leftmost piece. Bob and Carl continue to cut the rest of the cake
with ratio 1 : 1 and obtain pieces worth 3 and 4 to them respectively. If Bob
leaves, then Carl and Alice divide the cake with ratio 1 : 1. The leftmost
mark belongs to Carl so he gets the leftmost piece which is worth only 3 for
him.
5 Impossibility Results
In this short section we present two impossibility results. Both of them relate
to cake-cutting with contiguous pieces.
5.1 CON+PROP+POCA+RM are incompatible
The following cake shows that, when connectivity is required, any division
rule which is proportional and Pareto-optimal cannot be resource-monotonic,
even when there are only two agents.
Example 5.1. Consider the following cake, where the enlargement is marked
by the H sign:
vˆA 8 0 2
vˆB 0 5 5
H
vˆA 8 0 2 8
vˆB 0 5 5 0
In the smaller cake, any rule that is CON+PROP+POCA must cut after
the first slice. No other division is possible. Hence, Alice gets 8 and Bob
gets 10. In the larger cake, by proportionality we must give Alice at least 9.
Regardless of how it is done, Bob gets less than 10.
5.2 CON+PROP+POCA+PM are incompatible
The following cake shows that, when connectivity is required, any algorithm
which is proportional and Pareto-optimal cannot be population-monotonic.
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vˆA 0 5 0 2 0 0
vˆB 0 0 0 0 7 0
vˆC 2 0 2 0 0 3
Example 5.2. Consider the following valuations, where the value of the
entire cake is 7 for all agents:
We first prove that the agents must receive pieces in the following order,
from left to right: Alice, Bob, Carl. Note that by PROP, each agent must
receive a value of at least 7/3.
• If Carl receives the left piece, then by PROP the piece must also touch
its middle "2" slice. But then, only a value of 2 is left for Alice. By a
similar argument, Bob cannot receive the left piece. Hence, the leftmost
piece must be given to Alice.
• If Carl receives the middle piece, then by PROP it must touch its
rightmost "3" slice. But this leaves no value for Bob. Hence, the
middle piece must be given to Bob (and it must contain Bob's "7"
slice).
• this leaves Carl with the rightmost slice and a value of 3. By POCA,
Alice must receive all the cake to the left of the "7" slice of Bob. This
means that her value is 7.
Suppose Bob leaves. Now n = 2, so Carl must get a value of at least
7/2 = 3.5, so his piece must touch his middle "2" slice. But this entails that
Alice receives a value of at most 5.
Note that without POCA there is no contradiction. The initial value
of Alice could be less than 7. Indeed, in the next section we show that
CON+PROP+PM can be satisfied if Pareto-optimality is not required.
6 Existence Results
Let us remind the reader that vi denotes the relative value measure. The
value vi(X) can be thought of the percentage of utility Agent i realizes (com-
pared to the utility of the whole cake) if he receives piece X.
6.1 Equitable divisions
We present a population-monotonic division rule which is based on the notion
of equitable cake divisions.
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Definition 6.1. (a) A cake division X is called equitable if all agents receive
exactly the same relative value. Formally: vi(Xi) = vj(Xj) for all i, j ∈ N .
This value is called the equitable value of the division.
(b) An equitable division is called max-equitable if its equitable value is
maximal among all equitable divisions.
(c) An equitable division with contiguous pieces is called max-equitable-
connected if its equitable value is maximal among all equitable divisions with
contiguous pieces.
Max-equitable-connected divisions for two agents were studied by Jones
(2002). The generalization for n agents was mentioned by Brams et al. (2006),
but only for a special case in which the valuations of all agents are pairwise-
absolutely-continuous. This means that all valuations have the same support,
i.e. if a piece of cake has positive value to one agent then it has positive value
for all agents. This is a strong assumption which we do not make here. We
now show that a max-equitable division exists even with general valuations.
6.1.1 Exactly-proportional divisions
A special case of equitable solutions is where each agent receives exactly his
proportional share. As we will see such divisions are both resource- and
population-monotonic, but not Pareto-optimal.
Definition 6.2. A division X is called exactly-proportional if it gives every
agent a relative value of exactly 1
n
. Formally: vi(Xi) = 1n .
Every division rule that returns only exactly-proportional divisions obvi-
ously satisfies PROP. Moreover, it satisfies RM+PM:
• RM holds because when the cake grows/shrinks, all agents receive the
same fraction of a larger/smaller whole.
• PM holds because when an agent leaves/joins, the remaining agents
receive a larger/smaller fraction of the same whole.
Exactly-proportional divisions exist both with connected and disconnected
pieces, but they are not very efficient. When the pieces must be connected,
it is not always possible to divide the entire cake in an exactly-proportional
way.
Example 6.1. Suppose every agent wants a distinct sub-interval of the cake:
vˆA 2 0
vˆB 0 2
15
An exactly-proportional division must give each agent a value of exactly
1, yet every whole connected division gives one of them a value of 2.
An exactly-proportional division can be attained only if we allow to dis-
card some of the cake (i.e. we give upWH). We define the exactly-proportional-
connected division rule as the following variant of the Dubins-Spanier proce-
dure:
• Every agent marks a point xi such that vˆi([0, xi]) = 1n .
• The procedure selects the leftmost point xmin (breaking ties arbitrarily)
and gives [0, xmin] to the agent that made that mark.
• The remaining agents divide the cake recursively in the same way (keep-
ing the fraction 1/n fixed).
The exactly-proportional-connected division rule is not WH since there
is a remainder at the rightmost end of the cake. However, it is CON, RM
and PM.
When the pieces do not have to be connected, it is possible to divide the
entire cake in an exactly-proportional way. This is a corollary of the Dubins-
Spanier theorem (Dubins and Spanier, 1961). The exactly-proportional divi-
sion rule without connectivity is WH, PROP, RM and PM. Moreover, there
is a moving-knife procedure that actually finds an exactly-proportional divi-
sion; see Austin (1982) and Brams and Taylor (1996).
However, the exactly-proportional rule is not Pareto-optimal. This is
shown by Example 6.1, in which the exactly-proportional rule gives both
agents a value of 1 while the Pareto-optimal division gives them 2. More
efficient division rules are considered in the following subsections.
6.1.2 Max-equitable-connected divisions
In this subsection we show that there exists a max-equitable-connected solu-
tion, which satisfies CON, PROP, WH and PM.
Definition 6.3. (a) An agent-ordering, denoted by pi, is a permutation on
the set of agents N .
(b) A partition of the cake into n intervals is called a pi-partition if the
intervals are assigned to the n agents in the order specified by pi.
For example, a 132-partition is a division in which Agent 1 receives the
leftmost piece, Agent 3 receives the middle piece and Agent 2 receives the
rightmost piece.
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Lemma 6.1. For every agent-ordering pi, there exists an equitable pi-partition.
Proof. We present here a moving-knife procedure that finds the desired par-
tition. A formal proof, using the famous Borsuk-Ulam theorem, is given in
Appendix A. Without loss of generality we may assume that pi is the order
1, . . . , n. The procedure starts with the agents holding their knives at the
leftmost end of the cake. There is a large screen where the current equitable
value is displayed, which is zero at the beginning. During the procedure the
positions of the knives determine a division of the cake: the piece allocated
to agent i is the piece between knife of Agent i and the knife of Agent i− 1
(or for i = 1 the leftmost end of the cake). We assume that the valuations are
common knowledge. As the value increases on the screen each agent moves
his knife to the right until one of the following two things happen:
x
0 3 4 6 8
2
4
vˆ′([0, x])
x
vˆ′([0, x])
0 2 5.5
Figure 2: The moving knife procedure described in Lemma 6.1 applied in
a cake-division with three agents: Green (densely striped), Red (sparsely
striped), Blue (grid).
(a) The rightmost knife reaches the end of the cake.
(b) The knife of an agent reaches an interval for which the value measure of
that particular agent is 0.
In the first case the procedure stops and we have obtained an equitable
partition of the entire cake. In the second case we stop the knives temporarily,
freeze the value on the screen and the procedure enters the second phase. Let
j be the rightmost agent whose piece is adjacent to an interval which has a
zero measure. Every agent who comes after j in the predefined order can
increase the value of his piece by moving his knife to the right. We ask all
agents starting from j to move their knives to the right such that their value
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remains constant. We continue till either (a) holds, or another agent reaches
an interval of zero measure, or Agent j reaches the end of his zero measure
interval. In the first case the procedure stops, in the second case we continue
the second phase with this new agent, in the third case we resume the first
phase. Since the rightmost knife is moving continuously and monotonically
to the right, eventually it will reach the end of the cake5.
Example 6.2. We demonstrate the somewhat informal description of the
above moving-knife procedure on an example. Consider the piecewise ho-
mogeneous cake depicted in Figure 2. Three agents: Green, Red and Blue
seek an equitable division of the cake, which has total value of 8 for each of
them. This is a special case where the same relative value indicates the same
absolute value. Suppose they agreed on using the above procedure with the
Green, Red, Blue order. Immediately at the beginning, we are at option (b)
because Blue's knife is at a zero-value region. Thus, we enter phase 2 and
Blue's knife moves to x = 4. Then we return to phase 1. As the knives move
to the right, the agents increase the value of their pieces until they reach a
utility of 2. At that moment Green's knife rests at x = 2, Red's knife at x = 3
and Blue's knife at x = 4.5. The value displayed at the screen becomes fixed
at this point since Red reached an interval which has no value for him. As
Red gradually increases his piece, Blue moves his knife to the right making
sure his value does not change. This continues until Blue himself reaches
x = 6, which is the start of an interval of zero value. Red stops his knife at
x = 5.5, but Blue continues until he reaches the right end of the cake.
Let X be a certain division of a cake. We denote the smallest relative
value obtained by an agent by vXmin and the largest by v
X
max, such that for all
i = 1, . . . , n: vXmin ≤ vi(Xi) ≤ vXmax. Note that vXmin = vXmax if an only if X is
an equitable division.
Lemma 6.2. Let pi be an agent-ordering and X a pi-partition of a cake. Let
Y be an equitable pi-partition of the same cake, having an equitable value vY .
Then: vXmin ≤ vY ≤ vXmax.
Proof. We prove that vXmin ≤ vY , the proof for vY ≤ vXmax is analogous.
Assume w.l.o.g. that pi is the ordering 1, . . . , n. Assume by contradiction
that vY < vXmin. In particular, this means that Agent 1 receives a smaller
value in partition Y than in partition X, that is, v1(Y1) < v1(X1). Hence,
the cut-point between pieces Y1 and Y2 is to the left of the cut-point between
pieces X1 and X2.
5Here, we use implicitly that the valuations are bounded. If vˆi([0, c]) were infinite then
the rightmost knife could move to the right indefinitely without reaching the end of the
cake by slowing down.
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Y1 Y2 . . . Yk . . . Yn−1 Yn
X1 X2 . . . Xk . . . Xn−1 Xn
Figure 3: Proof of Lemma 6.2.
The same is true for the n-th agent: vn(Yn) < vn(Xn). Hence the cut-
point between pieces Yn−1 and Yn is to the right of the cut-point between
pieces Xn−1 and Xn. Because the leftmost cut-point moved to the left and
the rightmost cut-point moved to the right, there must be a pair of adjacent
cut-points such that the left one moved to the left and the right one moved
to the right (see Figure 3). Hence, there must be an index k, such that:
• The left boundary of piece Yk is to the left of the left boundary of Xk,
and
• The right boundary of Yk is to the right of the right boundary of Xk.
This means that Yk ⊃ Xk which in turn implies that vk(Yk) ≥ vk(Xk). This
contradicts our assumption that vY < vXmin.
For every agent-ordering pi, there may be many different equitable pi-
partitions. However, all these divisions have the same equitable value:
Lemma 6.3. For every agent-ordering pi, there is a unique value vpi which
is the equitable value in all equitable pi-partitions.
Proof. Assume that there are two equitable pi-partitions: X with equitable
value vX and Y with equitable value vY . By Lemma 6.2, vX ≤ vY ≤ vX .
Hence vX = vY .
Lemma 6.4. There exists an agent-ordering pi for which the equitable value
vpi is at least 1
n
.
Proof. Let X be a contiguous proportional division of the cake (by Steinhaus
(1948) such a division always exists). Because X is proportional, vXmin ≥ 1n .
Hence, by Lemma 6.2, the value of an equitable division in the same ordering
as X is at least 1
n
.
A straightforward corollary of the above lemmata is that the orderings
can be sorted by their equitable value. Since for n agents there are finitely
many different orderings the following holds.
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Corollary 6.1. A max-equitable-connected division always exists.
We define the max-equitable-connected division rule as the rule that re-
turns all max-equitable-connected divisions of the cake.
Theorem 6.1. The max-equitable-connected division rule is contiguous, pro-
portional, whole, and population-monotonic.
Proof. Contiguousness and wholeness hold by design, while proportionality
due to Lemma 6.4.
We now prove PM. Note that the max-equitable-connected rule is essen-
tially single-valued, so it is sufficient to prove downwards-PM. Let X be a
max-equitable-connected division for n agents with equitable value vX . Sup-
pose that an agent i ∈ N abandons his share. Give agent i's piece to an
agent that holds an adjacent piece, e.g. to agent i + 1. Call the resulting
division Y . We obtained a whole and contiguous division for n− 1 agents, in
which the smallest relative value enjoyed by an agent is at least vX (indeed,
the value of all agents except i+ 1 is exactly vX , and the value of agent i+ 1
is probably larger). By Lemma 6.2, the maximum equitable value in the new
situation is at least vX . Hence, in the max-equitable-connected division for
n− 1 agents, the relative value of all agents is weakly larger than in the pre-
vious division. The value of the entire cake has not changed, so the absolute
value of all remaining agents is weakly larger too.
Remark 6.1. Thomson (2011) discusses the egalitarian-equivalent division
rule for resource allocation and proves that it is resource-monotonic. The
egalitarian-equivalent rule is similar in spirit to the max-equitable-connected
rule (although the setting is different - multiple homogeneous resources versus
a single heterogeneous resource); hence it is not surprising that the max-
equitable rule satisfies RM.
The max-equitable-connected division rule has drawbacks as well. It does
not satisfy POCA (cf. Example 5.2) except in cases when the value measures
are pairwise-absolutely-continuous, i.e. have the same support (Brams et al.,
2006). As the next example shows it also violates RM.
Example 6.3. Consider the following cake.
vˆA 5 5 1 1
vˆB 1 1 5 5
H H
vˆA 5 5 1 1 5 5
vˆB 1 1 5 5 1 1
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In the smaller cake, the unique max-equitable-connected division gives
the two leftmost slices to Alice and the two rightmost slices to Bob. The eq-
uitable value is 10/12. However in the larger cake the unique max-equitable-
connected division is attained by cutting exactly in the middle, decreasing
the equitable value to 1/2. While Alice gains from the division and her
(absolute) value increases to 11, Bob loses since his absolute value drops to
7.
6.2 Leximin-optimal divisions: PROP+PO+PM
Lexicographic optimization as a solution concept is used in various fields of
fair division (Moulin, 2004). Dubins and Spanier (1961) were the first to
employ it in a cake-cutting setting. Later, Dall'Aglio (2001); Dall'Aglio and
Hill (2003); Dall'Aglio and Di Luca (2012) presented various properties and
approximation algorithms for finding such leximin divisions.
The leximin idea is simple: First we narrow down the solution set to
divisions that maximize the utility of the poorest agent. Then among those
solutions that satisfy this criterion, we select those which maximize the util-
ity of the second poorest agent. We repeat this process with the third, fourth,
etc. poorest agent. To introduce this concept formally first we define lexico-
graphical ordering of real vectors.
We say that vector y ∈ Rn is lexicographically greater than x ∈ Rn (de-
noted by x ≺ y) if x 6= y and there exists a number 1 ≤ j ≤ n such that
xi = yi if i < j and xj < yj.
Definition 6.4. (a) For a cake division X, define the relative-leximin-welfare
vector as a vector of length n which contains the relative values of the agents
under division X in a non-decreasing order.
(b) A cake division Y is said to be relative-leximin-better than X if
the relative-leximin-welfare vector of Y is lexicographically greater than the
relative-leximin-welfare vector of X.
(c) A cake divisionX is called relative-leximin-optimal if no other division
is relative-leximin-better than X.
(d) We define the relative-leximin division rule as the rule that returns
all relative-leximin-optimal divisions of the cake.
The terms absolute-leximin-welfare vector, absolute-leximin-welfare better
and absolute-leximin-welfare optimal and the absolute-leximin division rule
are defined analogously.
Example 6.4. In the following cake, the absolute-leximin division rule splits
the leftmost slice between Alice and Bob, giving each of them 6. The right-
most slice is given to Carl. Thus, the absolute-leximin-optimal vector is
21
(6,6,9). The relative value vector of the above division is (6/12, 6/12, 9/30).
vˆA 12 0
vˆB 12 0
vˆC 21 9
The corresponding relative-leximin welfare vector is (9/30, 6/12, 6/12) =
(3/10, 1/2, 1/2), which is not optimal. The relative-leximin rule divides the
leftmost slice between all three agents, giving 1/6 to Carl (absolute value
3.5) and 5/12 to Alice and Bob (absolute value 5). The rightmost slice is
given to Carl. The relative-leximin-optimal vector is (5/12, 5/12, 5/12).
Dubins and Spanier (1961) use the compactness of the space of value-
matrices to prove that leximin-optimal cake divisions always exist. The proof
is equally valid for absolute and relative leximin-optimal divisions. Hence,
both the absolute- and the relative- leximin division rules are well-defined.
We now prove some properties which are common to both absolute- and
relative- leximin rules.
Lemma 6.5. The absolute- and the relative-leximin division rules are both
Pareto-optimal.
Proof. By definition, if a division Y Pareto-dominates a division X, then
both the absolute and the relative leximin-welfare vectors of Y are larger
than those of X.
Given a division X, we say that agent i is relatively-poorer than agent
j if vi(Xi) < vj(Xj) and relatively-richer if vi(Xi) > vj(Xj). We say that
i is weakly-relatively-poorer than j if vi(Xi) ≤ vj(Xj) and weakly-relatively-
richer if vi(Xi) ≥ vj(Xj). The terms (weakly-)absolutely-poorer and (weakly-
)absolutely-richer are defined analogously based on the absolute values vˆi, vˆj.
Lemma 6.6. For every absolute/relative-leximin-optimal division X, if agent
j is absolutely/relatively poorer than agent i then agent j believes that the
piece of agent i is worthless: vˆj(Xi) = vj(Xi) = 0.
Proof. If this were not the case, then we could take a small bit of Xi and
give it to agent j, thus achieving an absolute/relative-leximin-better division.
But this contradicts the leximin-optimality of X.
In Example 6.4, in case of the absolute-leximin-optimal division, Carl is
absolutely-richer than Alice and Bob, and indeed his share is worthless for
both of them.
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Suppose X is an old division and Y is a new division of the same cake. We
say that an agent i conceded a slice to agent j if there is a slice that belonged
to agent i in X and belongs to agent j in Y (in other words, Xi ∩ Yj has a
positive Lebesgue-measure). If X and Y are both absolute/relative-leximin-
optimal, then by Pareto-optimality, Xi ∩ Yj has positive value to both who
concedes the slice (i) and the recipient (j). Hence, we have the following
corollary of Lemma 6.6:
Corollary 6.2. Let X and Y be two leximin-optimal divisions. If, when
switching from X to Y , agent i conceded a slice to agent j, then in division
X, agent i is weakly-poorer than j, and in division Y , agent i is weakly-richer
than j.
Lemma 6.7. The absolute and the relative leximin division rules are essen-
tially single-valued.
Proof. The proof is the same for the absolute and the relative leximin rules.
Hence, we omit the adjectives "absolute" and "relative" during the proof.
Suppose X and Y are two different leximin-optimal divisions. By switch-
ing from X to Y , some agents may have lost value; call these agents unlucky.
Similarly, call the agents who gained value lucky. We are going to prove that
there are neither unlucky nor lucky agents; this implies that all agents have
exactly the same value in both divisions.
Suppose by contradiction that agent i is unlucky. Then, he must have
conceded a slice to at least one other agent, say j. By Corollary 6.2, i is
weakly-poorer than j in X and weakly-richer in Y . But this means that j
is also unlucky. So, all slices conceded by unlucky agents are held by other
unlucky agents. Suppose the unlucky agents take back all the slices that they
conceded. This has no effect on the lucky agents, but strictly increases the
value of the unlucky agents, since they now have at least the value that they
had in X. But this contradicts the optimality of Y . Hence, there are no
unlucky agents. If Y had a lucky agent without having any unlucky agent
that would contradict the optimality of X.
Since X and Y were arbitrary leximin-optimal divisions it follows that all
leximin-optimal divisions have the same value vector.
Lemma 6.8. The absolute and the relative-leximin division rules are population-
monotonic.
Proof. Again the proof is the same for the absolute and the relative leximin
rules. Thanks to Lemma 6.7 it is sufficient to prove downwards-PM.
Let X be a leximin-optimal division of C. Suppose that agent i leaves
and abandons his share Xi. So X is now a division of C \ Xi among the
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agents N \ {i}. If Xi is divided arbitrarily among N \ {i}, the result is X+,
a division of C which is weakly leximin-better than X. Let Y be a leximin-
optimal division of C among N \ {i}. Y is weakly leximin-better than X+
and hence weakly leximin-better than X.
The rest of the proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 6.7. Call
the agents that lost value in the move from X to Y , unlucky. Suppose by
contradiction that agent i is unlucky. Then he must have conceded a slice to
an agent j, who must also be unlucky. All slices conceded by unlucky agents,
are held by other unlucky agents. If those took back all the slices that they
conceded, then all of them would be strictly better off while the lucky ones
would remain unaffected. This contradicts the optimality of Y . Hence there
are no unlucky agents and PM is proved.
Corollary 6.3. The absolute leximin division rule is resource-monotonic.
Proof. The same proof works as in case of the previous lemma. The cake
enlargement can be treated as a piece that was acquired from an agent who
left the scene.
Note that we can not extend Corollary 6.3 to the relative leximin rule.
The reason is simple: cake enlargements leave the absolute values of the
pieces intact, but might alter their relative values. In particular it may
happen that an agent  say j  lost utility although he received the same
piece in both cakes, i.e. Xj = Yj, but vCj (Xj) > v
C′
j (Yj), where C
′ denotes the
enlarged cake. Also it is possible that the relative-leximin-optimal division
of the enlarged cake is lexicographically smaller than the relative-leximin-
optimal division of the smaller cake. The following subsections are devoted
to uncovering the main differences between the absolute- and relative- leximin
rules.
6.2.1 Absolute-leximin rule: PO+RM+PM
Theorem 6.2. The absolute-leximin division rule is Pareto-optimal, population-
monotonic and resource-monotonic.
Proof. PO follows from Lemma 6.5, PM from Lemma 6.8 and RM from
Corollary 6.3.
Unfortunately, the absolute-leximin rule is not PROP. For instance, in
Example 6.4, the absolute-leximin-optimal division gives Carl a value of 9,
which is only 3
10
of his total cake value.
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6.2.2 Relative-leximin rule: PROP+PO+PM
Theorem 6.3. The relative-leximin division rule is proportional, Pareto-
optimal and population-monotonic.
Proof. PROP holds because proportional divisions exist. The relative-leximin-
welfare of a proportional division is at least ( 1
n
, . . . , 1
n
), hence the optimal
relative-leximin-welfare vector must be at least ( 1
n
, . . . , 1
n
). PO follows from
Lemma 6.5 and PM from Lemma 6.8.
Example 6.5. The following cake shows that the relative-leximin rule is
not RM. The largest value that can be given to both Alice and Bob is 9.
H
vˆA 9 9 0 0 0 0
vˆB 9 9 0 0 0 0
vˆC 4 4 10 0 0 18
vˆD 4 4 0 10 0 18
vˆE 4 4 0 0 10 18
Hence, in the smaller cake, the optimal relative-leximin-welfare vector is
(9/18, 9/18, 10/18, 10/18, 10/18). It is attained by halving the two leftmost
slices between Alice and Bob, and giving the three slices at their right to
Carl, David and Eve, in that order.
In the larger cake, the largest value that can be given to Carl, David and
Eve from the additional slice at the right is 6. So the largest value that can
be given to them from the four rightmost slices is 16. However, the total cake
value has doubled for them. Hence, if Alice and Bob keep their share of 9, the
relative-leximin-welfare vector changes to 16/36, 16/36, 16/36, 9/18, 9/18.
Note that Alice and Bob are now relatively-richer than Carl, David and
Eve, and their pieces have a positive value for them. Thus, by Lemma 6.6,
the division in which Alice and Bob keep their current shares cannot be
relative-leximin-optimal.
6.2.3 Relative-leximin-connected rule: CON+PROP+POCA but
not PM+RM
For completeness we mention the relative-leximin-connected rule, which re-
turns the divisions that are relative-leximin-optimal among all contiguous
divisions. It is clearly CON+PROP+POCA. By Example 5.2, it cannot be
PM. Indeed, in that example, the initial leximin-welfare vector is (3,7,7) with
A receiving a value of 7, but after agent B leaves the leximin-welfare vector
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becomes (5,5) and A's value drops down to 5. Similarly, by Example 5.1 it
cannot be RM.
Remark 6.2. Instead of leximin principle, we could have used another
welfare-optimization criterion such as the utilitarian criterion - maximiz-
ing the sum of utilities. The absolute- and relative-utilitarian rules are both
Pareto-optimal and population-monotonic, and absolute-utilitarian is also
resource-monotonic. However, in contrast to our leximin rules, they are not
essentially-single-valued and not proportional. The merit of the leximin rules
is the combination of efficiency (PO) and fairness (PROP) with (at least
some) monotonicity properties.
6.3 The rightmost-mark rule: CON+PROP+WH+RM
In this section we present an resource-monotonic procedure that produces a
proportional and contiguous division of the whole cake for 2 agents.
Case I Case II
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A′
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B′
enlargement︷ ︸︸ ︷
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B′′
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A′′
enlargement︷ ︸︸ ︷α β
α β
β α
Figure 4: Illustration of the rightmost-mark division rule. Alice's cut mark
is denoted by α, while Bob's cut mark by β.
The procedure is called the rightmost-mark rule and consists of the fol-
lowing steps.
• Ask both agents to make a mark which cuts the cake in half according
their own valuation.
• Cut the cake at the rightmost mark and give the slice on the right to
the agent who made the mark.
• The remaining part is given to the other agent.
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Theorem 6.4. For two agents, the rightmost-mark procedure is contiguous,
whole, proportional and resource-monotonic.
Proof. CON, WH and PROP are obvious. We now prove that the procedure
is RM. Since the rule is single-valued, it is sufficient to prove upwards-RM.
Suppose w.l.o.g. that Bob made the rightmost mark on the smaller cake
(see Fig. 4). Thus, Bob obtained the piece marked with B, which is worth
exactly half for him. Alice received the part marked with A, which is worth
more than half for her. When the cake is enlarged two cases are possible:
The order of the cut marks made by the agents remains the same or gets
reversed. In the first case, Bob still receives the rightmost cake (marked with
B'). Since it still worth for him half of the cake, and since the cake is enlarged,
he is not worse off. Neither is Alice, who receives a piece that contains her
original share.
In the second case, Alice receives the rightmost piece A. Note that she
believes that the pieces A and B represent the same value, and A contains
A, her original piece. Thus, she is not worse off. Similarly, Bob evaluates A
and B the same, and he received B, thus he is not worse off either.
There are several ways to generalize the rightmost mark rule. The re-
verse Dubins-Spanier and reverse Even-Paz methods coincide with it for two
agents. Unfortunately as we have shown in Section 4 neither of these proto-
cols are resource-monotonic.
Remark 6.3. The rightmost-mark procedure is CON+PROP+WH+RM.
By Example 5.1, it cannot be Pareto-optimal. Indeed, in that example Bob
makes the rightmost mark, which falls between the 2nd and 3rd slice. Bob
receives the third slice which is worth 5 for him and Alice receives the other
two slices which are worth 8 to her. But this is not PO because Bob could get
the 2nd slice and increase his value to 10 without decreasing Alice's utility.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We studied monotonicity properties in combination with the classical fairness
axioms of proportionality, contiguousness and Pareto-optimality. Table 2
summarizes the properties of the various division rules.
In the connected case, each of our four rules satisfies two of the four
properties {POCA,WH,RM,PM}. Thus, the fair divider has to choose be-
tween strong efficiency (POCA) without monotonicity, or strong monotonic-
ity (RM+PM) without efficiency, or weak efficiency (WH) with only one
monotonicity property (RM or PM). We are still looking for a rule that
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Connected rules n CON PROP PO(CA) WH RM PM Sec.
exact-prop-conn. Any Yes Yes No* No Yes Yes 6.1.1
max-equitable-conn. Any Yes Yes No* Yes No Yes 6.1.2
rightmost-mark 2 Yes Yes No* Yes Yes No 6.3
rel-leximin-conn. Any Yes Yes Yes Yes No* No* 6.2.3
Disconnected rules n CON PROP PO(CA) WH RM PM Sec.
exact-prop. Any No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 6.1.1
absolute-leximin Any No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6.2.1
relative-leximin Any No* Yes Yes Yes No Yes 6.2.2
Classical rules n CON PROP PO(CA) WH RM PM Sec.
Banach-Knaster Any Yes Yes No Yes No No 4
Cut and Choose 2 Yes Yes No Yes No No 4
Dubins-Spanier Any Yes Yes No Yes No No 4
Even-Paz Any Yes Yes No Yes No No 4
Fink Any No Yes No Yes No Upw 4
Selfridge-Conway 3 No Yes No Yes No No 4
Table 2: Properties of division rules presented in this paper. No means that
the property is not satisfied by the rule, while No* means that the property
cannot be satisfied by any rule satisfying the other properties marked with
Yes in the same line. In case of the Fink rule, Upw indicates that  with
some additional adjustment  the rule is upwards-PM.
satisfies WH+RM for three or more agents, as well as a rule that satisfies
WH+RM+PM for two or more agents.
In the disconnected case, each of the three rules satisfies three of the four
properties {PROP,PO,RM,PM}. We are still looking for a rule that satisfies
PROP+PO+RM+PM, or for a proof that such a rule is impossible.
Our work leaves a few open questions. The rules of the first two groups
 with the exception of the rightmost mark rule  are difficult to implement,
to say the least. We were mainly concerned with the theoretical possibilities:
which combinations of axioms are feasible and which are not. We leave the
actual design of protocols to future research.
Another interesting question is how the monotonicity axioms relate to
envy-freeness, a fairness property as important and well-studied as propor-
tionality.
Additionally, in this paper we ignored strategic considerations and as-
sumed that all agents truthfully report their valuations. An interesting fu-
ture research topic is how can we ensure monotonicity in truthful division
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procedures.
Although we proved many negative results related to classical protocols,
there is one promising lead. With appropriate adjustments the Fink rule
turned out to be upwards population-monotonic. Thus, there may be set-
valued rules, with desirable properties, which satisfy only one direction of the
monotonicity axioms. In many cases the divider may not care about the other
direction. For instance it is plausible that the agents are less sensitive about
issues related to downwards-PM, as it is more likely that a new participant
arrives than that there is someone who abandons his share and leaves the
division process.
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A Existence of max-equitable-connected divi-
sions
Results about connected divisions use the Borsuk-Ulam theorem. It is about
functions defined on spheres. Define the sphere Sn−1 as the set of points
(x1, . . . , xn) satisfying: |x1|+ · · ·+ |xn| = 1 (it is a sphere in the l1 metric).
Theorem (Borsuk-Ulam). Let fi, for i = 1, . . . , n − 1, be real-valued func-
tions of n variables, that are continuous on the sphere Sn−1 .
Then, there exists a point on the sphere, X∗ = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Sn−1, such
that for all i: fi(X
∗) = fi(−X∗).
Assume that the cake is the interval [0, 1]. Each point (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Sn−1
corresponds to a partition of the cake to n intervals, marked X1, . . . , Xn, such
that the length of interval Xi (the i-th interval from the left) is |xi|. Note
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that each partition corresponds to many points which differ in the signs of
some or all of the coordinates (this representation of the partition space
was introduced by Alon and West (1986) and used e.g. by Simmons and Su
(2003)).
Suppose w.l.o.g. that the players are ordered from 1 to n, so that player i
receives the piece Xi. For every point X = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Sn−1 and for every
i ∈ 1, . . . , n− 1, define the function fi(X) as follows:
fi(X) = sign(xi) · vi(Xi)− sign(xi+1) · vi+1(Xi+1)
Note that when xi = 0, interval Xi is empty so vi(Xi) = 0. Hence, the
functions fi are continuous on Sn−1.
Hence, by the Borsuk-Ulam theorem, there exists a point X∗ on Sn−1
such that for all i: fi(X∗) = fi(−X∗). By definition of the fi, the cake
division that corresponds to X∗ necessarily satisfies:
sign(xi) · vi(X∗i ) = sign(xi+1) · vi+1(X∗i+1)
This is possible only if for all i ∈ (1, . . . , n− 1):
vi(X
∗
i ) = vi+1(X
∗
i+1)
Hence the division X∗ is equitable.
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